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I Introduction
When the Soviet Union launched its first satellite in
1957, the Americans, who had always assumed
their technological superiority, were deeply
shocked. They responded with a crash programme
of training in science and engineering. Had the rate
of increase in training between 1957 and 1962
been sustained until 1992, there would have been
two scientists for every man, woman and dog in
America. So, we have to be careful not to
extrapolate wildly on the basis of events that are
temporally bounded.
Much of the discussion on globalisation is in
danger of ignoring this caveat. It is guilty of both
suggesting that we are witnessing a unique
phenomenon of global integration, and in believing
that this trajectory is unstoppable. But history tells
us something different. In many respects the
process of global integration we have witnessed in
the last two decades of the twentieth century
merely restores the levels of the late nineteenth
century (Baldwin and Martin 1999). In the
intervening decades, the process of inter-country
integration led to the development of political
processes which forced a move towards greater
inward focus.
In the same way, the current phase of global
integration is setting in train tensions which may
well slow, stop and even reverse these recent
trends. The obvious case is the rise in opposition to
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the
industrially advanced countries, but similar events
can be found in other parts of the world (for
example, the opposition of Indian farmers to
intellectual property rights). The focus in this
article is on whether globalïsation is associated
with rising economic insecurity; if it is, is there a
causal link between the two, and might this
insecurity threaten its sustainability?
As social actors (since we are not only academic
observers) we need to concern ourselves with
policies that might lead to the most positive
outcome for the most people, and especially for
the most vulnerable people. So it is important to
restate the obvious: globalisation, which is
essentially the global extension of the division of
labour that Adam Smith addressed, allows for
specialisation and has the potential to enhance the
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quality of lives of a great many people. In fact, it
has done so manifestly over the past two decades,
which is one of the reasons why it has deepened so
rapidly and pervasively The policy challenge,
therefore, is to fashion these global processes in
such a way that the gains (including with respect to
increasing security) are spread more widely and,
given the concerns of this Bulletin, that this occurs
in a framework of greater rather than lesser
economic security1 The key issue here is to
recognise that global processes are constructed and
are within our control - they are neither inevitable
nor beyond remedial action.
2 Globalisation: a Brief Overview
Globalisation can be defined as the pervasive
decline in barriers to the global flow of information,
ideas, factors (capital and labour), technology and
goods. As we have seen, a similar phenomenon
occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century But there are three distinctive features of
late twentieth century globalisation which have an
impact on economic security:
Although countries were deeply integrated
during this earlier period of history, the 'reach' of
global processes in terms of the absolute and
relative numbers of those affected by global
processes is now almost certainly much wider.
Argentina and Australia may have been major
exporters of commodities and importers of
finance in the nineteenth century, but in the
current period these flows have considerably
more pervasive effects on their populations.
Related to this, the recent period has seen a
much more marked globalisation of ideas, world
views and ideology than in the nineteenth
century (where the global flows were of people,
finance and goods). This affects not just the
spread of global advertising and aspirations to
remote areas around the globe, but also
expectations about consumption powers and
human rights.
In the late nineteenth century, trade flows
tended to be in final products, whereas we are
now witnessing greater levels of 'functional'
integration whereby producers in different
locations are involved in increasingly
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differentiated sub-processes in the production
chain. (This difference has led some observers to
contrast nineteenth century 'internationalisation'
with twentieth century 'globalisation'). A con-
temporary traded final product, such as a
computer or a camera, typically involves
globally decomposed production processes
involving producers in many countries. Thus,
the coordination of global production networks
is increasingly complex and provides particular
challenges and powers to key firms acting on a
global stage.
A second feature of contemporary global processes
is that they are both complex and heterogeneous.
Globalisation has many dimensions and often these
will work in contradictory ways. Take, for example,
the case of labour. In the current period we are
simultaneously witnessing significant reductions in
the barriers to the mobility of skilled people, and
increases in the barriers to the mobility of the
unskilled. Their outcomes are also increasingly
complex. For example, as we shall see, it is not just
that inter-country income distribution has widened,
but that it has become much more complex in
nature.
And third, by definition, the economic dimensions
of globalisation represent a widening of the sphere
of specialisation and the division of labour, in this
case between economic actors in different
countries. At the same time, globalisation reflects a
significant speeding-up of the social division of
labour. Irs other words, structural change is both
pervasive and rapid, and since all structural change
involves adjustment (people moving out of
activities with declining returns and those entering
activities with expanding horizons), it is inevitable
that tensions will rise. Change - especially change
which affects livelihoods - is always stressful.
3 Dimensions of Economic
Insecurity: Emerging Trends
Before we consider the link with global processes, it
is helpful to briefly unpack what we mean by
'economic insecurity'. In the discussions which
follow, we shall distinguish between the following
major components and trace their links with recent
processes of globalisation:
Perceptions of insecurity may or may not
accurately reflect the incidence of insecurity;
Volatility and uncertainty are primary
components of economic insecurity;
Economic insecurity is reflected in absolute
livelihoods and relative standards of living;
There are a variety of 'units of analysis' in
assessing economic insecurity
So, how do these different components of economic
insecurity look as global processes continue to
unfold?
3.1 Perceptions of insecurity may be more
important than the incidence of insecurity
In considering economic insecurity, one central
concern lies with the nature and quality of
perceptions. A story from the Second World War is
illustrative here. An attempt was made to gauge the
morale of two groups of US military personnel; one
was a group of academics specialising in Japan
studies who were drafted into the military earned
military incomes and wore military uniforms but
were allowed to continue with their professional life
as before; the second group comprised a set of
infantry soldiers in the Pacific. The surprising
outcome was that the morale of the former group
was lower than that of the infantry soldiers. The
reason for this was to be found in the expectations
and reference group of each of the two samples. The
Japan specialists compared themselves to their
colleagues who were on regular incomes and did
not have to wear uniforms; the infantry soldiers
compared themselves to their friends and
colleagues who had been killed or wounded.
Hence, the first critical point to note about
insecurity is that it is inherently subjective. It may
not be so much a matter of the absolute levels of
insecurity, but the perception of insecurity which
drives political actors in their response to global
processes.
How does this translate into the modern world of
globalisation and economic insecurity? Consider
first the case of the high income countries. Robert
Reich, the former US Secretary for Labour and a
distinguished academic, observing the large and
growing incidence of poverty in the USA,
characterised these victims as being an 'underclass'.
On top of all underciasses - by definition - is an
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'overclass'. But between these two groups, argued
Reich, was a new and growing category the 'anxious
class', the middle class and professionals formerly in
secure employment but now feeling vulnerable to
the winds of change allowed into the USA by global
integration (Reich 1991). A similar story can be told
about the UK where it is widely believed that
employment security has declined at a societal
level. This is despite the fact that, according to the
UK Treasury, studies of employment tenure show
virtually no change: people continue to move jobs
at the same frequency as in previous periods, across
all skill levels.
Hence, at some level, perhaps the most important
element of economic insecurity in the modern
world is the growing gap between expectations and
reality It may or may not be true that economic
insecurity has grown or fallen. Some UK evidence,
as we have seen, suggests that in some respects
there has been no change; in other cases, and in
other measures, it is unquestionable that economic
insecurity has grown. But the key factor affecting
the response to globalisation is that it is widely
believed that globalisation is associated with
significantly heightened levels of insecurity This
view not only probably reflects reality but is one
that has been widely spread through the
globalisation of ideas and opinions. It is not
uncommon, therefore, to find middle classes in
developing countries who in reality have a large
measure of security but who believe that they too
are victims of heightened economic insecurity
The point here is not to deny that globalisation has
led to greater economic insecurity - in many cases,
this is unambiguously the case. At issue is whether
people believe themselves to be more or less
insecure, since this is what affects their responses to
global processes. We have no systematic evidence
on these perceptions - but casual empiricism
suggests that this perception is increasingly
widespread, fuelling a growing body of protests
against the WTO and other institutional
manifestations of globalisation.
3.2 Economic security is undermined by
volatility and uncertainty2
One of the consequences of openness has been that
economic activity is increasingly reliant on external
economic events. In recent decades, this external
Table 1: Emerging market economies: external financing (billions of dollars)
environment has become increasingly volatile. Not
only has the pecking order of the world's top
companies changed markedly (with Japanese firms
recently suffering badly), but financial flows have
been especially volatile, particularly those directed
towards developing countries (Griffith-Jones 1998).
Currency crises have proved to be particularly
destabilising. Some indicators of this instability are:
During the 1990s private capital flows to
developing countries increased dramatically (at
least until the East Asian crisis in 1997),
dwarfing official flows. However, between 1996
and 1998, private flows to the emerging
economies fell by $ 124bn (Table 1), though they
recovered somewhat in 1999.
The volatility of both capital flows and GDP
growth was much greater in developing countries
than in the industrial countries (Table 2).
The costs of this volatility were greater for
Source: International Monetary Fund (1999)
Table 2: Volatility of capital flows and GDP in selected countries
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developing than industrialïsed countries (Table
3). More developing countries experienced
currency crises than industrial countries, and
with a greater negative impact on output.
Thus, although currency mobility was a
characteristic of both nineteenth century inter-
nationalisation and twentieth century globalisation,
the latter period was characterised by significantly
greater volatility A primary driver of this instability
was the development of new technologies which
allowed for instantaneous (and often also
automated) trading. Allied to this, the march of a
gobai policy-agenda has ied to the abolition of
capital controls and other banking regulations at
the behest of globalising institutions (such as the
IMF and the World Bank), and this has made
recipient countries more open to the volatile flows
of finance. Currently, more than the equivalent of
$1 ,500bn is exchanged every day in global currency
markets, yet less than 10 per cent of this is required
to fuel international trade. The balance represents
1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private flows, net 123.8 152.6 193.3 212.1 149.1 64.3
Net direct equity 31.3 82.7 97.0 115.9 142.7 131.0
Net portfolio investment 36.9 105.6 41,2 80.8 66.8 26.7
Net bank lending 55.6 -35.8 55.0 15.4 -60.4 -103.4
Official flows, net 36.5 1.8 26.1 -0.8 24.4 41.7
Reserves excl. gold
-45.4 -94.8 -85.1 -49.9 -60.7
Standard deviationt Latin
America
Caribbean
Sub
Saharan
Africa
Middle
East &
North
Africa
East Asian
Miracle
Industrial
Countries
Capital flows as % of GDP
Real GDP growth
2.8
4.7
4.4
5.3
6.1
7.9
1.5
3.0
1.7
2.2
calculated over the period 70-92 Source: 1-lausmarin and Gavin (1996)
Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until the time when annual
output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises,
Per cent of mises in which output was lower than trend after the crisis began
Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the cmiii began until the time when annual
output growth returned so its trend and by averaging over all crises that had output losses.
Source. 1Mb (1998)
speculative flows, arid here currency traders are
characterised by herding behaviour. This means
that the swings which follow changes of 'market
sentiment' (often irrationally based) are very
substantial indeed, leading to a succession of
currency crises. This is a form of instability which
has a major impact on currency rates, economic
activity and employment, and hence is a prime
driver of insecurity in the current age. Although the
Asian Crisis of 1997 also reflected economic
fundamentals, the rapid swings of currency out of
the region sharpened the economic cycle, and led to
very significant falls in output in many of the
region economies.
3.3 Economic insecurity is reflected in
both absolute and relative standards of
living
An important component of economic insecurity is
its impact on poverty, for in its most basic sense,
'security' offers the prospect of sustained survival.
The problem here is that 'poverty' is a fuzzy concept
- it is simultaneously a measure of absolute
standards and one of relative standards of well-
being. Here the evidence suggests that recent
decades of globalisation have seen an increase in
both of these meanings of poverty, and in this sense
we can conclude that at least for many of the world
population, economic insecurity has increased.
What is this evidence?
Despite high rates of growth in many regions of the
world, there has been little dent in the number of
Table 3: Costs of crises in lost output relative to trend
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people living in absolute poverty (defined as living
at below the equivalent of $1 per day, 1985 purch-
asing power parity). As can be seen from Table 4,
the numbers have hovered at around 1 .2bn. Some
regions, notably sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and
Central Asia have experienced sharp rises in the
number of the absolutely poor, just as their
participation in the global economy was deepening.
But it is not just absolute levels of poverty that have
increased. So, too, has relative poverty A striking
phenomenon of the post-war period has been the
development of the so-called 'twin-peaks'
distributional pattern. This can be seen from Figure
1 (not that the horizontal axis is on a log-scale),
which suggests a significant change, with the
development of a more unequal and complex
pattern. A cluster of economies has emerged at the
bottom end of the scale (with per capita incomes of
less than 10 per cent of the US level) and a process
of catch-up at the top end of the scale.
Another measure of inter-country income
distribution is provided by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Human Development
Report. This suggests a striking increase in inter-
country inequality over the past 180 years (Table
3), particularly after the Second World War (when,
as we can see from Table 5, globalisation advanced
rapidly).
These widely quoted inter-country distributional
figures must, however, be treated with a 'health-
Number of
crises
Cumulative
loss of output
Crises with
output loss' (in
Cumulative
loss of output
per crisis' (in
% points)
%) per crisis with
output losses3
(in % points)
Currency crises 158 4.3 61 7.1
Industrial 42 3.1 55 5.6
Emerging market 116 4.8 64 7.6
Table 4: Population living below $1 a day (PPP 1985 prices)
Source. World Bank. Poverty Reduction and the World Bank (1996); Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (2000).
Figure 1: World income distribution, 1960 and 1988
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18
1987 1990 1993 1998
East Asia and Pacific 415 452 432 278
China 306 376 365 223
Excluding China 109 76 66 56
Europe and Central Asia 1 7 18 24
Latin America and Caribbean 64 74 71 78
Middle East and North Africa 25 22 22 21
SouthAsia 474 495 505 522
Sub-Saharan Africa 217 242 273 291
Total 1,197 1,293 1,321 1,214
Table 5: Gap in per capita incomes between richest and poorest countries (top and bottom quintiles)
warning' since they are calculated at official exchange
rates rather than by taking account of the actual
purchasing power of currencies (that is using PPP
rates). Consequently there has been a debate recently
on whether global income distribution has indeed
become more unequal. On the one hand, it is argued
that the rapid growth of China and India in recent
years has led to a narrowing of inter-country income
differentials, that is, to an improvement in inter-
country income distribution (Wolf 2000). This is
because these two countries, which have seen a
significant rise in average per capita incomes,
account for a very large share of global population.
Therefore, comparing income differentials between
countries on the basis of population-weighted
average incomes produces an equalising trend,3
But, global income inequality can also be measured
in relation to individual incomes, rather than to
inter-country average incomes. That is, although
average per capita income in China may have risen,
worsening income inequality means that very large
numbers of the Chinese population have either
been excluded from the gains from growth, or may
even be worse off (Khan 1999). If this is factored
into the analysis, then the share of global income
going to individuals has indeed become more
unequal during the past two decades.
Source: Data from 1999 Human Development Report
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The growth of global inter-country inequality has
been mirrored by the growth of inequality within
countries, both in the high- and low-income
worlds:
In high income economies in general, income
distribution has tended to become more unequal
(Streeten 1998), particularly in the Anglo-Saxon
economies (Dunford 1994).
In the Netherlands real wages fell between 1979
and 1997 (1-lartog 1999).
In the USA, real wages were lower in the mid-
1990s than they were in the late 1960s, and
family incomes only held up as a consequence of
longer working hours and more working
members of the family (Kaplinsky 1998).
Between 1970 and 1992, the proportion of
national income received by the bottom quintile
was broadly stable (in fact it fell from 5 to 4 per
cent), whilst that of the top quartile rose from 41
to 45 per cent (and that of the top 5 per cent
rose from 16 to 18 per cent) (Cime 1997).
In China, in the context of a very rapid pace of
economic growth and integration into the global
economy - the exportlGDP ratio rose from 10.5
Period Ratio of incomes
1820 3:1
1870 7:1
1913 11:1
Rising controls over migration
D Rising protectionism
D Two world wars
D One depression
1960 30:1
1990 60:1
1997 74:1
per cent in 1985 to 21.3 per cent in 1995there
was a sharp rise in inequality This was between
urban and rural areas, coastal and interior
provinces, and within urban and rural areas
(Khan 1999).
In Chile, often thought to be the paradigmatic
gainer from globalisation, the gini-coefficient
increased from 0.46 in 1971 to 0.58 in 1989
(Rodrik 1999).
Inequality has grown markedly in the transition
economies (Table 6).
Inequality between skilled and unskilled wage
earners has tended to increase in the industrially
advanced countries (Wood 1994) and in Latin
America over the past decade (Wood 1997)
There are two ways in which these developments -
both with regard to absolute and relative levels of
poverty - square up with the issue of insecurity
First, in its most fundamental sense, security is the
right to sustained livelihoods; if this right
diminishes, then by definition, security falls.
Absolute poverty unambiguously falls into this
category But, second, 'livelihoods' are also partially
socially defined. What might have seemed
acceptable or even a privilege during the nineteenth
century in Europe - for example, heating in very
cold climates - may be seen to be a necessity in the
twenty-first century Hence, relative poverty too can
be seen as a component of economic security It is
here that expectations become an important
component of the discussion of economic
Table 6: Gini co-efficients, 1987/8 and 1993/5
Source: 1999 Human Development Report
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insecurity. People feel insecure in relation to what
they have come to expect as 'normality'; the
distance between social groups is also part of this
'normality', so when it increases, people feel more
insecure. And it is possible, as we shall discuss
below, that it is this feeling of insecurity, rather than
the reality of insecurity, which determines social
action.
3.4 What is the 'unit of analysis' in
assessing economic insecurity?
Whose security is at issue? At the highest level of
disaggregation we are concerned with individuals
and head counts - how many people are affected by
global processes, and in what ways. But humans are
also parts of groups, including the family For
example, in the USA, real wages of unskilled labour
(one measure of economic security) fell for over two
decades and only regained their 1973 levels in
1998; yet family incomes increased because in
general the participation rate increased and people
worked longer hours. In other cases, the 'family' has
little meaning, since in large parts of the world (the
Caribbean, parts of Africa and increasingly in rich
countries such as the UK) the 'family' is not a stable
unit.
Another unit of measurement is the producing
institution; the firm or the farm. Here the spread of
globalisation has been associated with substantial
volatility, especially in poor countries, since one of
the primary characteristics of import substituting
industrialisation was that it was underspecialised.
Trade liberalisation has meant that even when
overall output has been maintained or even
1987/8 1993/5 Increase
Ukraine 0.23 0.47 0.24
Russia 0.24 0.48 0.24
Lithuania 0.23 0.37 0.14
Hungary 0.21 0.23 0.02
Poland 0.26 0.28 0.02
increased, labour productïvity has increased and
firm-mortality and labour retrenchment has been
high. This has meant massive insecurity for
employed labour, often with dire consequences for
real wages. For example, as the South African
economy has liberalised, production and exports in
the garments industry have expanded. But in the
KwaZulu Natal region, for example, whilst recorded
formal sector employment (with relatively high
wages and job protection) has declined from
45,000 to 16,000 over the past four years, so
employment in the informal sector (with lesser
security and lower wages) has grown by more than
16,000. In Latin America, too, trade liberalisation
during the 1990s was associated with falling
employment and hence economic insecurity for the
formal sector labour force (Table 7). As a general
rule, therefore, we can conclude that liberalising
low income countries have experienced significant
volatility in terms of the population of firms and
that this has almost certainly had a disproportionate
impact on labour.
Another related measure of insecurity has been its
impact on sub-national regions. We have come to
recognise recently that a significant element of
economic activity is its spatial specificity It is not so
much Brazil that exports leather shoes, but the
Sinos Valley (Schmitz 1995); Pakistan surgical
instrument industry is located in Sialkot (Nadvi
1999), and India knitting industry in Tirapur
(Tiwari 1999). So, when sectors suffer due to
Source: Katz (1999)
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political developments (for example, changes in
trade preferences) and economic developments
(changes in exchange rates), so too do the fates of
whole regions. The incidence of currency crisis has
indeed meant significant realignments in
currencies, and globalisation has been associated
with changing trade preferences. In these cases,
globalisation has furthered this particular form of
economic insecurity
Finally, there are issues of gender and ethnicity
Here the evidence is uncertain, suggesting
considerable scope for further enquiry For
example, it is often asserted and widely believed
that women have suffered disproportionately from
globalisation. Yet much of the evidence does not
support this assertion. Participation rates in the
formal sector for women have risen (in one sense
an increase ici security, in another leading to a
double burden, which increases insecurity), and
there is considerable evidence that women
working in export processing zones earn more
than those working in the domestically-oriented
economy
In summary, therefore, we have witnessed profound
processes of structural change as countries
participate more deeply in the global economy The
point here is that this structural change generally
affects different groups within countries disprop-
ortionately The functional distribution of income
has become more unequal, with profits and the
Industnal production Employment Labour productivity
1970-1996 1990-1996 1970-1996 1990-1996 1970-1996 1990-1996
Argentina 1.18 4.87 -2.62 -3.15 3.80 8.02
Brazil 2.81 2.26 0.95 -6.41 1.86 8.67
Chile 2.76 6.40 1.51 3.49 1.25 2,91
Colombia 3.98 3.52 1.24 -0.22 2.74 3.74
Costa Rica 4.39 n.a. 4.83 n.a. -0.44 n.a.
Jamaica 0.11 n.a. 1.66 ria. -1.55 n.a.
Mexico 3.79 2.27 0.91 -0.03 2.88 2.30
Peru 1.17 5.09 2.85 1.97 -1.68 3.12
Uruguay 0.61 -1.46 0.37 -8.58 0.24 7.12
United States 2.39 5.04 0.35 0.30 2.04 4.74
Table 7: Output, productivity and employment growth in globalising Latin American
economies during the 1990s. (in percentages)
incomes of skilled labour rising sharply, whilst
those of unskilled labour have fallen, particularly in
the high income countries. Changing special-
isations have meant that particular sub-national
regions have often suffered particularly badly whilst
firm and farm mortality has been marked. All these
downsides to the rapid structural change which has
resulted from globalisation are examples of
enhanced economic insecurity
4 Conclusions: Causality and
Sustainability
We have observed an increase in different measures
of economic insecurity as global processes have
deepened in recent decades. Insofar as this
heightened insecurity has resulted from volatility,
there are clear causal links between the two. The
reduction in barriers to the inter-country flow of
finance, banking deregulation and the abolition of
capital controls, and the development and
utilisation of new technologies, can be seen as
primary causal drivers of volatility Less obvious is
the causal link between globalisation and poverty
(in both its absolute and relative senses). One driver
here is the growth of global competition,
particularly in labour intensive activities. This has
led to a bidding down of wage rates for unskilled
work. Often this low-road is furthered by
competitive currency devaluations.5 With regard to
poverty and income distribution, the same opening
up, which has allowed the holders of scarce skills
and resources to benefit from globalisation, has
exposed those less fortunate to enhanced
competition. They have suffered, both in absolute
and relative terms, and in this sense globalisation
can be seen to have directly increased their
economic insecurity
What might be the outcome of these global
processes? In the second half of the nineteenth
century, although there was a process of catch-up in
average living standards between Europe and the
USA, the consequence of large-scale migration saw
rising inequality in both the USA and in parts of
Europe. The consequence was the growth of
immigration controls in the USA and of
protectionism in Europe. Thus, as Williamson
points out:
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immigration policy in labor-scarce parts of the
global economy became increasingly less
generous and more restrictive prior to 1914,
and much of this retreat from open
immigration policies was driven by a defence of
the deteriorating relative economic position of
the working poor. In addition ... liberal
attitudes towards trade were brief, and
protection rose sharply almost everywhere on
the European Continent from the 1870s
onwards. (Williamson 1998: 69)
Are we going to witness a similar process in the
twenty-first century? That is, is the growing
economic insecurity which we are observing likely
to fuel a reaction against globalisation? We already
see signs of this in the protests against the WTO,
many of which are pitched in defence of 'labour',
invoking calls to the solidarity of global labour
interests, butin fact often reflecting the interests of
a particular fraction of global labour, that is, the
unskilled in an American economy without access
to substantial social security Similarly we can
witness a growing call in many developing
countries, not just from groups whose economic
security is clearly being eroded by global processes,
but also from groups who believe that they are
similarly threatened.
The realm of perception and belief is probably
crucial here. One of the lessons to be drawn from
history is that populations do not revolt when they
are suffering from absolute levels of poverty but
when their expectations are out of synch with their
real experience. Both the French and Russian
revolutions occurred after periods of relative
prosperity followed by drought and war
respectively which lowered the capacity of the
system to satisfy these rising expectations.
Globalisation in the twenty-first century is no
longer just the global extension of consumption
patterns or factors; increasingly it also reflects the
global extension of expectations. Growing
perceptions of economic insecurity as much as the
reality of growing economic insecurity, may well be
the Achilles' heel of contemporary globalisation.
Notes
The IDS Globalisation Team focuses its work on the
exploration of policies designed to better spread the
gains of globalisation - see www.ids.ac.uk/globall
The discussion on volatility is informed by the
work of my colleague Stephany Griffith-Jones.
However, Wolf k conclusions have been questioned
as resulting from a small sample of countries, and
Lundberg and Milanovic cite studies using larger
samples, which estimate that inter-country income
inequality has indeed increased (Lundberg and
Milanovic 2000).
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